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Towards a cognitive-sociological theory of  
subjectivity and habitus formation in neoliberal societies 
 
Abstract 
Disconcerting findings from sociological research suggest that Western youth are developing 
subjectivities that reflect neoliberal discursive formations of self-interestedness, 
competitiveness, and materialism. However, propositions about 1) the cognitive-affective 
mechanisms that explain how youth acquire and reproduce neoliberal ideology, or 2) the 
dispositions and behaviours that typify a neoliberal subject, remain vague. Therefore, in this 
article I provide a novel conceptualisation of these two psychosocial facets that can help 
advance understandings and investigations of the emerging modes and societal consequences 
of neoliberal subjectification. Specifically, I review major theoretical tenets from the 
respective literatures on neurocognitive development, social cognition, neoliberalism, and 
neoliberal hegemony. I then synthesise these tenets within a modified habitus formulation to 
sketch a testable cognitive-sociological model for explaining and exploring some of the 
distinct dispositional values, attitudes, and practices that youth raised in societies with 
institutionally and culturally prevalent neoliberal norms and discourses may potentially 
develop and enact. 
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The past three decades of neoliberal policy inputs and outputs have, to differing but 
considerable extents, transformed many Western countries’ major media, educational, 
cultural, and recreational institutions into market and ideological apparatuses (Hall and 
Rustin, 2015; McGuigan, 2010; Slater, 2015; Sloan, 2008). As a result of this ongoing 
structural reconfiguration, successive millennial generations (i.e., post-1980 birth cohorts), 
and particularly those in the USA and the UK, have been increasingly expose  to neoliberal 
discursive formations of self-interest, competiveness, and materialism (Coakley, 2011; Gill, 
2008; Weidner, 2009). Correspondingly, nascent sociological research is consistently showing 
that although millennials do actively construct and negotiate their selfhoods around the 
competing discursive systems of culture and value available to them, very often these are, as 
Harvey et al. (2013: 9) argue, ‘related to the circulation of global tropes of consumption and 
idealised neoliberal subjectivities’ (see also Coakley, 2011; Lloyd, 2012; O’Flynn and 
Petersen, 2007). 
But what exactly constitutes neoliberal subjectivity? To date, the sociological literature 
has offered rich explanatory accounts that describe various interlocked systemic imperatives 
and structural, discursive, policy, and civil society components that help engender the micro-
level processes of neoliberal subjectification (Binkley, 2011; Gill, 2008; Hall and Rustin, 
2015; Lloyd, 2012). However, propositions about: (1) the cognitive-affective mechanisms that 
explain how youth acquire and reproduce neoliberal ideology, or (2) the dispositions and 
behaviours that typify a neoliberal subject, remain vague (see e.g., Binkley, 2012; O’Flynn 
and Petersen, 2007; Weidner, 2009). Accordingly, a more in-depth conceptualization of these 
two psychosocial facets could help enhance and specify current understandings of how a 
neoliberal subject develops, thinks, feels, and acts. This could in turn advance empirical 
examinations of the emerging modes and societal consequences of neoliberal subjectification. 
Therefore, this article will provide an initial template for said conceptualization.  
To do so, we first review and draw links between the shared, synergistic, and 
complementary theoretical tenets from the literature on neurocognitive development and 
social cognition in order to lay a computational-representational paradigm-based account of 
the processes of subjectification and social reproduction.1  We then review the literature on 
neoliberalism and neoliberal hegemony as these apply to the USA and the UK: the world 
harbingers and enforcers of neoliberal doctrine (Ellwood, 2011; Hall and Rustin, 2015; 
McGuigan, 2010). Finally, we synthesize the theoretical tenets and empirical findings 
discussed throughout the article within a modified version of the habitus formulation to sketch 
a testable cognitive-sociological model. This model provides a novel approach to help explain 
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and empirically explore some of the distinct dispositional values, attitudes, and practices that 
youth raised in societies with institutionally and culturally prevalent neoliberal discursive 
formations may potentially develop and enact. This article can, therefore, be viewed as a 
response to ongoing calls for sociologists to engage with the cognitive sciences and clarify the 
psychological assumptions that are implicit in all sociological theories of culture and 
subjectivity (Cerulo, 2010; Srivastava and Banaji, 2011; Turner, 2007). Indeed, as Turner 
(2007: 359) argues, ‘Minimizing the cognitive is a genuine alternative strategy to engaging 
with cognitive neuroscience, but only if we choose to push social theory to the far periphery 
of knowledge, into a ghetto of its own making.’ 
Computational-Representational Theories Of Mind  
One of the leading paradigmatic positions in cognitive science is that the mind is a 
computational information-processing centre largely composed of evolutionarily endowed, 
hierarchically organized, and interconnected neural structures known as modules (Kumaran et 
al., 2009; Sperber and Hirschfeld, 2004). Modules are associated with and anchored across 
particular regions of the brain, and are hypothesized to be autonomous and informationally 
encapsulated devices with domain-specific functions (Bussey and Saksida, 2007). To wit, 
each module is theorised to possess a genetically determined syntactic algorithm with fixed 
parameters that is designed to only and mandatorily process certain sensory inputs to perform 
distinct cognitive tasks e.g., facial pattern recognition. Because of these computational 
properties, modules enable us to rapidly process, parse, remember, and react to the constant 
stream of sensory information that we encounter every day (Sperber and Hirschfeld, 2004). 
For the purposes of this article, a particularly important meta-module is termed the ‘medial 
temporal lobe memory system’ (Bussey and Saksida, 2007; Moscovitch, 2008). This module 
encompasses the hippocamupus and the parahippocampal, perirhinal, and entorhinal cortexes; 
houses multiple memory systems (e.g., working, episodic, semantic); and generates, stores, 
and interconnects smaller cognitive mechanisms known as schemas (Ghosh et al., 2014; 
Kumaran et al., 2009; van Kesteren et al., 2013).  
 Schemas (a.k.a. scripts, frames, gestalts, mental models), are generative and subjective 
knowledge structures, that are acquired and can be modified throughout life during exposure 
to and active interactions with the outside world or via thought processes. These structures 
can contain and process mental representations about the self, culture, abstract concepts, 
political ideologies, social norms, material entities, meanings of words, or experienced and 
imagined events etc. (Brod et al., 2015; Chiao et al., 2010). Despite the wide range of possible 
representations that schemas can pertain to, an individual schema’s content consists of subject 
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specific, context-sensitive, and hierarchically slotted information that is varyingly fragmented, 
shallow, and abridged. However, singular units can link to associative networks of interrelated 
schemas to form more cohesive, coherent, and sophisticated mental representations (Gilboa 
and Marlatte, 2017; Kumaran et al., 2009). Extensive neuroimaging and experimental 
psychology research indicates that schemas are encoded and cultivated in neural networks 
through anchoring and reconstructive processes (Chiao et al., 2010; van Kesteren et al., 2013), 
that are enabled and reinforced by neuronal dopaminergic substrates and reactions (Tse et al., 
2011). Schema encoding and subsequent augmentation often occurs when incoming 
information is contextually, semantically, affectively, and/or conceptually congruent or 
otherwise associated with pre-existing superordinate schemas, which serve as informational 
attractor and scaffolding mechanisms (Gronau and Shachar, 2015; Robin and Moscovitch, 
2014; Tse et al., 2011). For example, one’s schema for doctors will likely be formed and 
syntactically defined upon first interacting with or learning about doctors. This coarse 
schema’s base syntax can over time modify and expand itself in accordance with new 
information that corresponds to one’s continued learning about and/or experiences with 
doctors or doctor-associated stimuli. These generative and combinatorial structural properties 
allow schemas to also connect and become co-activated with related schemas (Gilboa and 
Marlatte, 2017), which following the previous example, could include a nurse and/or health 
schema. 
 Schema encoding, modification, and networking are also essentially the processes 
underpinning attitudinal development. According to Bohner and Dickel (2011: 382) an 
attitude is a feeling or “evaluation of an object of thought [and attitude objects range] from the 
mundane to the abstract, including things, people, groups, and ideas”. Attitudes can therefore 
be construed as affect-based schemas that contain and process affective meanings, and are 
tightly connected to or subsumed within related information-based schemas (Schroder and 
Thagard, 2013; Lodge and Taber, 2005). One’s attitudes on welfare for example, will be 
necessarily tied to one’s knowledge about welfare programmes and recipients. Additionally, 
depending on the context of their formation, valence strength, and activation frequency, 
attitudes can be ad hoc and relatively disposable, or durable and potentially life-long, as is 
often the case with e.g., political attitudes and stereotypes (Lieberman et al., 2003; Lodge and 
Taber, 2005). Moreover, weakly-held attitudes are highly amenable and negligibly affect 
judgement and behaviour. Conversely, strong attitudes are deep-seeded, resistant to change, 
and can powerfully affect motivation, judgment, behaviour, and the processing and 
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development of information-based schemas (Kaplan et al., 2007; Lieberman et al., 2003; 
Schroder and Thagard, 2013). 
 Furthermore, schemas are consolidated and lie dormant in long-term memory waiting to 
be activated and retrieved in working memory. Evan’s (2008) updated version of the dual-
processing system paradigm, states that this process occurs through the activation of system 1 
–associated with implicit/tacit (i.e., reflexive, hot, automatic, nonconscious, offline) 
cognition- which delivers cued information to system 2- associated with explicit/agentic (i.e., 
reflective, cold, controlled, conscious, online) cognition. Hence, when cued, schemas can, 
depending on the context of their activation, manifest as conscious thoughts and guide 
deliberative actions. However, situational frequency and contiguity augment a schema’s 
activation potential and behavioural automaticity. This means that chronically elicited 
schemas become more salient, excitable, and reactive over time such that when triggered by 
proximate situational cues, they can actuate nonconscious judgements, decisions, and 
behaviours (Baumeister and Bushman, 2008; Fiske and Taylor, 2013). These instances can be 
idiosyncratic and benign as can be the case for schemas that represent and guide one’s 
morning routine practices or driving habits. Where this phenomenon becomes sociologically 
relevant, is in the case of schemas that contain intersubjectively shared sociocultural 
representations, because as will be discussed in the next section, their level of automaticity 
plays a critical role in subjectification and social reproduction (Brubaker et al., 2004; 
Kitayama and Park, 2010; Lodge and Taber, 2005). Yet, despite their power to propel 
individuals to nonconscious cognitive, affective and/or behavioural reactions, a schema’s 
automatic function may in certain contexts and to varying degrees be superseded through 
concerted conscious effort (Bohner and Dickel, 2011; Lieberman et al., 2003). In particular, 
this can occur when individuals experience situations that run counter to their expectations, as 
these can induce an aversive arousal state (i.e., cognitive dissonance). This is because people 
have an innate inclination to maintain cognitive consonance (Lodge and Taber, 2005). 
Therefore, instances that activate internal inconsistency can force individuals to consciously 
engage with and then potentially alter their deep-seeded preconceptions and dispositional 
behaviours (Lieberman et al., 2003). However, this innate inclination can also lead individuals 
to reify their pre-existing schemas, and to unconsciously avoid information that may induce 
cognitive dissonance e.g., alternative political ideologies (Lodge and Taber, 2005).  
 To be certain, schema encoding, development, and processing are highly complex and 
dynamic phenomena that are dependent on various neurobiological chemical reactions, 
sensory motor systems, other cognitive mechanisms, innate psychological drives, and social 
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propensities. These are far too numerous and complicated to go over in this parsimonious 
review, as are the theories and debates on how these all work and interact. However, the 
following summary statement and key points are quite empirically substantiated, and arguably 
accepted, shared, and/or implied by much of the neuroscience, cognitive psychology, and 
social cognition literatures. In sum, a schema’s content, complexity, consolidation, saliency, 
behavioural automaticity, and connection to and co-activation with other schemas are largely 
determined by the frequency and socio-environmental and affective context in which it is 
accessed and utilised (Gilboa and Marlatte, 2017; Schroder and Thagard, 2013; van Kesteren 
et al., 2013). But, once encoded, schemas can: 
 Store and organize memories, affects, knowledge and ideas; including their 
respective attributes and relationships to related schemas (Gronau and Shachar, 2015). 
This also includes information such as, motives, intentions, situations, and goals that 
“enable or inhibit certain behaviours, and causal sequence of events, as well as the 
specific behaviours themselves” (Baumeister and Bushman, 2008: 152). 
 Enable the processing of affective, contextual, discursive, and semantic meanings 
and associations (Schroder and Thagard, 2013). 
 Facilitate learning by enabling the rapid integration of new associations linked to 
incoming information (Brod et al., 2015).  
 Function as heuristic mechanisms that enable quick judgments and decisions 
(Kumaran et al., 2009).  
 Constitute an individual’s mental representations of their self, and the 
intersubjectively shared cultural values, norms, attitudes and practices of their social 
groups (Chiao et al., 2010).  
Social Cognition, Subjectification, and Social Reproduction 
Possibly the majority of social cognition theories (SCTs) stem from the computational 
representational paradigm described above, and thus share the same informationprocessing 
understanding of cognition, and emply a schema-based or analagous conception of mental 
representations. However, these SCTs tend to focus more on explaining the ways that innate 
and acquired cognitive structures enable and are influenced by social interaction, learning, 
self-awareness, group dynamics, and culture (Bandura, 2001; Fiske and Taylor, 2013). There 
is naturally some disagreement between these various cousin theories (see e.g., Henrich and 
Boyd, 2002), but they for the most part have shared, complementary, and non-conflicting 
tenets that, when considered together, paint an account of subjectification and social 
reproduction, which goes as follows. 
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Generally, SCTs begin with the premise that humans start developing their schema 
architectures during infancy by observing and mimicking the interpersonal practices and 
linguistic uses of their immediate family, and concurrently through ongoing interaction with 
people and social institutions (Bandura, 2001; Fiske and Taylor, 2013; Kitayama and Park, 
2010). Social institutions are understood by SCTs as patterned distributions of behaviours and 
material resources that explicitly and implicitly superimpose upon individuals, specific and 
organized forms of social order and information (Hewer and Roberts, 2012; Ridgeway, 2006). 
These forms consist of cultural or political ideas, values, attitudes, histories, rules for 
acceptable behaviours, and practices, which usually function to perpetuate the status quo. 
Individuals, therefore, generate and form their subjectivities from active engagement with the 
social groups, institutional-discursive data, and cultural repositories available to them, in 
conjunction with repeated social interactions, rewards, sanctions, and negotiation of values 
with others. Thus, individuals can to a substantial degree constitute their subjectivities 
consciously because they are to a meaningful extent able to deliberatively take in, modify, and 
even dismiss the social information with which they are presented (Augoustinos et al., 2014). 
This agrees with Bandura’s (2001: 1) argument that: ‘Personal agency operates within a broad 
network of socio-structural influences. In these agentic transactions, people are producers as 
well as products of social systems.’  
SCTs further suggest, however, that subjectification is also a considerably nonconscious 
process that functions through innate cognitive and psychological propensities and 
mechanisms. Of note, these include theory of mind; conformist social learning, attribution, 
and prestige biases; and mnemonic storage and elaboration devices, which enable individuals 
to mentalize the beliefs, desires, and perspectives of others, predict behaviours, intuit 
symbolic meanings, and anticipate and adapt to social situational expectations (Godfrey et al., 
2017; Henrich and Boyd, 2002; Sperber and Hirschfeld, 2004). These also subliminally 
motivate individuals to want to identify with their respective social groups and culture, and to 
automatically attend to and construct mental representations of valuable, common, and widely 
shared social information (Kitayama and Park, 2010; Shimizu et al., 2017). Put simply, this all 
means that people are significantly predisposed and probabilistically more likely to detect, 
schematically internalize, and over time implicitly conform according to, social information 
that is: (1) repeatedly encountered and observed; (2) cognitively, affectively, and 
behaviourally congruent and contiguous; and (3) institutionally and culturally ubiquitous, 
valorized, and enforced (Augoustinos et al., 2014; Chiao et al., 2010; Lodge and Taber, 2005; 
Schroder and Thagard, 2013). This will vary by individual, but the more this predominant 
  
8 
social information becomes internalized, reinforced, and suffused in people’s formative 
schema networks, the more they can do the following: 
 Form a major component of a person’s self-identities (Augoustinos et al., 2014). 
 Manifest as non-conscious cognitive, affective, and behavioural responses to lived 
relations and everyday institutional and cultural experiences and imperatives (Fiske 
and Taylor, 2013; Schro¨der and Thagard, 2013; Shimizu et al., 2017). 
 Lead individuals to naturalize, justify, legitimize, and conform to existing power 
relations and social inequalities (Augoustinos et al., 2014; Godfrey et al., 2017). 
 Place durable neurocognitive parameters that can automatically block, bias, or distort 
the development of schemas for, or intake of, information corresponding to, opposing 
cultural and political ideas and practices (Chiao et al., 2010; Kaplan et al., 2007; 
Lodge and Taber, 2005). 
 Organize and constrain a wide range of behaviours in a fashion ‘consistent with the 
structural conditions framing the situation, even when that behaviour is not directly 
and materially constrained by those conditions’ (Ridgeway, 2006: 9). 
 Cause individuals to behaviourally and implicitly reproduce larger social structures 
and corresponding patterns of stratification and inequalities, even in situations ‘in 
which the material constraints of the structure are insufficient to fully control 
individual behavior’ (Ridgeway, 2006). 
As this relates to social reproduction, SCTs posit that, in aggregate, these micro-level 
conditions can lead to macro-level sociocultural inertia (Henrich and Boyd, 2002; Ridgeway, 
2006; Schroder and Thagard, 2013). 
However, the generative and ultimately physically, biologically and socially constrained 
nature of human cognition means that an agent’s encoding of even the most ideologically 
charged and institutionally disseminated social information is never an exact replication of the 
source data (Henrich and Boyd, 2002; Kitayama and Park, 2010). Our unique cognitive 
faculties, experiences, cultural geo-historic specificities, social positioning, and agency lead 
us to remember, process, recombine, and reproduce even dominant social information in 
fuzzy, incomplete, novel, or permutated ways that can mildly to significantly differ from 
individual to individual and from generation to generation. Furthermore, agents are often 
surrounded by both stable and more dynamic sources of social information, such as the mass 
media. This results in exposure to ‘[a] continuous and overwhelming flow of information, 
which either endorses or challenges the status quo’ (Hewer and Roberts, 2012: 175). When 
looked at in tandem, all these inherent socio-cognitive dynamics can go some way towards 
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explaining why we, for instance, are not institutional drones or carbon copies of our parents, 
and why societies are, to varying degrees, divergent and always changing. In other words, 
society does not indelibly stamp us, it instead provides us with foundational sociostructural 
algorithms that we are to some meaningful extent free to consciously modify and act on. 
Therefore, while relatively homeostatic, any given set of hegemonic institutional 
arrangements is never permanently fixed, as societies are inherently chaotic systems that are 
sensitive and continuously subject to spontaneous micro- and mesolevel agent-based 
modifications. 
While the fused SCT account outlined above is somewhat similar to Talcott Parson’s 
structural functionalism and Pierre Bourdieu’s field theory, it differs from these classic 
sociological theories in the proceeding ways. First, unlike Parson’s ‘oversocialised man’ or 
Bourdieu’s ‘habitus’, this account is based on empirically tested conceptualizations of how 
people’s neurocognitive architectures are developed and augmented through social 
interactions and both automatic and deliberative agency. Second, these architectures are 
composed of schemas that contain specific yet modifiable and context-sensitive content. This 
very much differs from Bourdieu’s habitus construct, which effectively entails a content-free, 
general learning, relatively fixed, and reactive mechanism (Burawoy, 2012). Third, this 
account does not reduce subjectification or social reproduction to either socio-structural or 
cognitive-structural determinants, nor to conscious or nonconscious agency. Rather, it 
suggests that subjectification and social reproduction are the interrelated products of mutually 
reinforcing and dynamic interactions between biological-genetic, cognitive-affective, and 
institutional-discursive mechanisms and processes. These in turn enable and are enabled by 
volitional, dispositional, habitual, and spontaneous cognition and action. That said, later 
sections will demonstrate how this account can be further incorporated into a habitus re-
formulation to explain neoliberal subjectification and reproduction, but before doing so, we 
must first briefly discuss the literatures on neoliberalism. 
What is Neoliberalism? 
Neoliberalism refers to a political-economic paradigm based on an ideology that calls for the 
state implementation, facilitation, and enforcement of free-market economic systems and 
logic across national and global settings, and essentially across all forms of human 
organization and decision-making (Hall and Rustin, 2015; Peck and Tickell, 2002). Initially 
rising to prominence in the 1980s in the UK and the US, neoliberalism has significantly 
shaped the 21st century world order (Ellwood, 2011; Hall and Rustin, 2015; Plehwe et al., 
2007). This paradigm has been influenced by several Western epistemic communities (e.g., 
Austrian and Frieburg Schools of Economics, the Mont Pelerin Society). Thus, various 
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provincial strands of neoliberalism have sprouted e.g., Brazilian New Capitalism, German 
Ordoliberalism (Mirowski and Plehwe, 2009). This section, however, will only focus on 
outlining the key theoretical premises and policy prescriptions associated with the dominant 
UK and US strand. 
 The core of neoliberal theory and ideology as can be extracted from the works of seminal 
neoliberal theorists, starts with the assumption that human beings are predominantly 
possessive and instrumentally rational individuals. This indicates that while humans are 
capable of altruism, they will primarily and in the first instance behave in ways that are in 
accordance with their perceived self-interests (Friedman, 2002). From this essentialist 
conception of human nature follows the key normative position that despite their self-
interested predispositions, people’s motivations and actions can and should be channelled for 
progressive socioeconomic development. However, this must only be done through political-
economic systems that engender relatively unfettered market forces, negative freedom, and 
the legal protection and appropriation of private capital (Hayek, 1994). Conversely, any 
attempts to harness the powers of the state to redistribute wealth and regulate markets for the 
public good, however benevolent and well intentioned, will have disastrous socio-economic 
outcomes. This is primarily because these objectives as traditionally advanced by state 
socialism and to a lesser extent by Keynesian forms of regulated capitalism, require excessive 
government economic intervention that distorts the natural pricing equilibrium mechanisms of 
supply and demand. Invariably, this results in the inefficient and wasteful allocation of finite 
resources and services (Friedman, 2002). Furthermore, these political-economic systems 
necessarily infringe on individuals’ freedom to utilize their capital as they choose, which has 
the consequent effect of stifling the psychological incentives necessary for entrepreneurial 
innovation and economic growth. Coupled, these cumulative macro and micro effects 
inevitably generate high inflation, stagnant economies, and unproductive state dependent 
citizenries that in extreme cases can lead to despotism (Hayek, 1994).  
 As such, neoliberals advocate for monetary policies aimed at controlling inflation 
(Friedman, 1948). They postulate that in favouring monetary over fiscal policies, governments 
and central banks can help to increase and stabilize the real value (as opposed to nominal 
value) of financial assets. This puts more money into the hands of investors and entrepreneurs, 
and incentivizes them to make investments, which will lead to the creation of jobs and more 
efficient economic growth than can be achieved by means of government fiscal stimulus 
policies. Neoliberals further argue that in order to maintain international competitiveness and 
induce and accelerate economic growth, countries should 1) eliminate or drastically reduce 
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trade barriers, corporate and income taxes, government public expenditures, and financial, 
labour and environmental regulations; 2) partially or fully privatize their natural resources, 
state enterprises, and services; and 3) focus on generating exports. In so doing, countries can 
gain from their comparative advantages in factor endowments, maintain market credibility, 
achieve fiscal solvency, and attract foreign direct investment. 
 However far from laisse-faire, neoliberals argue that a sound and prosperous economy 
necessitates state intervention to enforce contracts, protect property rights, and shore up 
markets in times of economic crisis (Friedman, 1948; Hayek, 1994). Thus, a minimal degree 
of funding for public services and private enterprises through fiscal revenues is consistent 
with neoliberal theory (e.g., negative income tax), provided that these are not “inimical to the 
initiative and functioning of the market” (Hartwell, 1995: 42). Nonetheless, neoliberals 
emphatically argue for the reduction of the welfare state by for example, making welfare 
benefits means-tested and temporary. They further propose that the primary function of 
welfare and education institutions should be to condition and train individuals to be self-
reliant, entrepreneurial, and responsible decision makers. Moreover, public institutions should 
be made to compete for public funds against other public institutions and private profit and 
non-profit organisations. To facilitate this public institutional restructuring, neoliberals 
advocate for neo-managerial policies and corporate style accountability metrics and targets to 
help eliminate wastefulness, incentivize positive performances, measure outcomes, and 
maximise customer satisfaction (Chubb and Moe, 1990; Friedman, 2002). Neoliberals 
hypothesize that the sufficient enactment of their policy prescriptions will in the long-term 
create prosperous and dynamic, but stable and efficient national and international markets, in 
addition to the skilled, self-reliant, and flexible workers needed to maintain and compete in 
them (Friedman, 2002; Hartwell, 1995).  
 Geo-political specificities notwithstanding, since the governments of UK Prime Minister 
Thatcher and US President Reagan, the ideas and policies described above have been steadily 
implemented and advanced by interlocking groups of elite politicians, businesspeople, and 
intellectuals (Hall and Rustin, 2015; Mirowski and Plehwe, 2009; Plehwe et al., 2007). 
However, rather than ushering in more stable, beneficent, and equitable market societies than 
the post-WW2 Keynesian system, the neoliberal epoch has been marked by frequently 
recurring global financial crises, deep recessions, skyrocketing levels of socioeconomic 
inequality and environmental devastation (Ellwood, 2011; Hall and Rustin, 2015). Despite 
these consistent detrimental outcomes, neoliberal hegemony has not been supplanted, nor 
faced any serious unsettling as, to all extents and purposes, outbursts of public unrest and 
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popular social movements have been relatively short-lived, subdued, or co-opted (Hall and 
Rustin, 2015; Reed, 2014).  
Neoliberal Hegemony 
It is not the intent here to imply that neoliberalism has become totalised, fixed, and 
uncontested. UK and US societies are like all others, marked by ideological ruptures and 
points of contestation generated by the constant dynamism of competing forces. Indeed, the 
neoliberal era has seen multitudes of resistance from the 1990s anti-globalization movements, 
to the 2010s Occupy encampments, to the recent rise of far-right nativist groups. 
Nevertheless, the fact does remain that major US and UK cultural and public institutions, such 
as mass media and education, have been considerably restructured by the types of policies 
described above, and turned into neoliberal market and ideological apparatuses that are 
significantly shaping millennials’ selfhoods, social relations, and practices. 2  
 For example, neoliberal policies such as the US’s 1996 Telecommunications Act and the 
UK’s Communication Act 2003 lifted restrictions on media ownership. Resultantly, print 
media and public broadcasts continue to be co-opted and stripped of substance by corporate 
conglomerates, or worse still, turned into manufacturers of ridiculous infotainment that 
celebrates the opulence of the rich and famous (Coleman, 2013; McChesney and Nichols, 
2009), or vilifies the poor (Jensen and Tyler, 2015). In the UK for instance, there has been a 
recent influx of what is described as ‘poverty porn’ television shows (e.g., Benefits Street). 
These are documentary style programmes that depict welfare recipients as underserving and 
lazy scroungers. As Jensen (2014:2), argues, these shows “perform an ideological function 
[by generating] a new 'commonsense' around an unquestionable need for welfare reform”. 
Neoliberal ideology can also be traced in the mainstream press’ carefully spun and widely 
circulated sound-bites and opinion pieces that call for the reduction or elimination of welfare 
services, taxes, and union rights; the privatisation of public institutions and services; and the 
removal of economic, labour and environmental regulations (Jensen and Tyler, 2015; Plehwe 
et al., 2007). Notably, these messages are often developed by neoliberal think-tanks e.g., 
Adam Smith Institute, Heritage Foundation, Centre for Policy Studies, Institute of Economic 
Affairs (Plehwe et al., 2007). Moreover, this ideological saturation also includes an erosion of 
criticisms of corporate practices and neoliberal policies, along with a near constant vilification 
and misrepresentation of egalitarian ideals, unions, teachers, public schools, welfare 
recipients, redistributive policies, and market-critical political figures and organisations 
(Goldstein et al., 2011; Jensen, 2014). The few independent media that report non-elite 
interests, critical voices, and substantive policy debates are marginalized, constantly under-
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funded, and have very limited communicative reach (McChesney and Nichols, 2009). 
Although we can only speculate at this point and notwithstanding the contribution made by 
other possible causal factors, these media conditions and distributed discourses may to some 
extent be contributing to at least two related phenomena. The first is the UK public’s 
decreasing support for paying more taxes to raise benefits for low-income and unemployed 
people, which has been declining for 30 years, and is noticeably lowest amongst millennials 
(Duffy et al., 2013). The second is the declining union membership in the UK and USA, 
which is also lowest amongst millennials (O’Connor, 2017).  
 Relatedly, popular culture now disseminates neoliberalism congruent discourses of 
materialism, competitiveness and self-interestedness that are more emphatic and prevalent 
than during pre-neoliberal times (Konrath et al., 2011; McGuigan, 2010; Uhls and Greenfield, 
2011a).3 For example, a psycholinguistic study of the lyrics from the US’s Hot 100 Billboard 
songs from 1980-2007, found that since 1980, the words ‘I’ and ‘Me’ have appeared more 
frequently in popular music lyrics, while prosocial words like ‘We’ and ‘Us’ have 
significantly dwindled (DeWall et al., 2011). The researchers also note that the rise in self-
centred and antisocial lyrics found in popular music correlates with several large-scale 
psychometric survey results indicating that American millennials are more narcissistic and 
self-interested than previous generations. Indeed, as Twenge and Campbell (2010) argue, the 
large majority of birth cohort studies have reported significant increases in individualistic and 
materialistic traits and decreases in civic interest in the American millennial generation. 
Related developmental psychology studies also show that the ubiquity and resulting exposure 
to materialistic media messages over the past 30 years, are correlated with rising levels of 
concerns over attaining wealth, fame, status, and material possessions amongst UK and US 
millennials (Easterbrook et al., 2014; Uhls and Greenfield, 2011b). Whereas other studies 
have speculated that this exposure may be contributing to post-1980 generational decreases in 
empathy, altruism, and communality (Konrath et al., 2011; Uhls and Greenfield, 2011a). 
Correspondingly, over the last two decades, UK and US commercial broadcasts have been 
dominated by reality television shows such as X-Factor, American Idol, and The Apprentice, 
which feature and promote cut-throat competition, narcissistic characters, rugged 
individualism, and materialism. In direct reference to these types of shows, Konrath et al., 
(2011: 189) note that, “overall, the agentic and narcissistic qualities found in modern media 
seem consistent with decreasing empathy”. 
 With regards to education institutions, policies such as the US’s 2009 Race To The Top 
Initiative and the UK’s Education Act 2011, further instituted and extended the use of market-
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inspired accountability metrics to measure schools’ competence and rank, and to in some 
instances determine their funding (Slater, 2015). As these metrics are primarily based on how 
well students perform on high-stakes standardised tests, teachers have been increasingly 
trained in and pressured to focus on, ‘teaching to the test’ classroom practices (Brown, 2010; 
Sloan, 2008). These practices are normally modelled on rote learning and behaviourist 
approaches, in that they are specifically designed to train students to attain an automated and 
uncritical acceptance of predetermined answers. Additionally, students are generally told that 
their test scores will determine whether and which university they can attend, which will in 
turn determine what types of jobs they can expect to attain (Patton, 2013). Current public 
education thus largely functions as another pivotal institutional environment where 
millennials are tacitly socialized to adopt consumerist, competitive, and instrumentalist mind-
sets and behaviours, which are concomitant with neoliberal ideology. Again, while we can 
only speculate at this point, these educational changes may help to partly explain why UK 
university enrolment in public service-orientated courses, such as education, which usually 
attracts students hoping to become teachers, has fallen from 198,120 in 2004/5 to 173,015 in 
2013/14. Inversely, enrolment for business courses, which generally lure students hoping to 
get high-paying corporate jobs, has risen from 290,455 in 2003/4 to 336,600 in 2013/14 
(Ramsden, 2015). These figures closely match longitudinal trends in the USA (NCES, 2016), 
and business is now by far the most popular university course in the UK and the USA. 
 All these institutional and discursive-formational changes have also coincided with a 
substantial weakening of labour unions and increase in the commodification of public spaces 
and leisure (Coakley, 2011; Peck and Tickell, 2002). This further diminishes millennials’ 
probability of encountering counter-hegemonic ideas and practices, which then potentially 
negatively moderates their understanding of, interest in, or ability to imagine alternative 
cultural, institutional, and political-economic arrangements. The socio-structural and 
ideological convergence and synchronisation described in this section has thus resulted in a 
conjuncture where most US and UK millennials have no choice but to be repeatedly exposed 
to institutionally and culturally omnipresent neoliberal discursive formations. Hence, as 
suggested in recent ethnographic accounts, millennials are developing subjectivities that 
strongly reflect a neoliberal syntax or habitus as it were, which leads them to practices that 
contribute to the wider processes of neoliberal hegemony and reproduction (Coakley, 2011; 
Harvey et al., 2013; Lloyd, 2012). For example, with regards to his field study on young UK 
call-centre workers, Lloyd (2012:14) argues that:  
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A significant reorientation of the labour market, coupled with an ideological 
swing towards consumerism, competition and social mobility, has 
fundamentally altered the outlook, identity and habitus of what was once called 
the working-class. The young men and women in my study are a generation of 
individuals with no link to previous forms of working-class sociality, culture 
and identity. Instead they embody the key [neoliberal] cultural and economic 
themes of our time. 
Constituting A Neoliberal Habitus: A Working Model 
The habitus construct has been routinely and widely criticised for being loosely defined, 
unfalsifiable, and psychologically inadequate (Burawoy, 2012).4 Van dijk (1998), for 
example, argues that the habitus offers a less explicit notion of a system of mental social 
representations, and its conception of ‘disposition’ is premised on circular reasoning because 
it “defines cognitive structures in terms of their output (such as social practices) which 
precisely need to be explained in terms of other cognitive representations.” (pg. 47). Despite 
these limitations, the habitus is a useful and rather pliant conceptual device that can be 
retrofitted with the empirically substantiated theoretical insights from the literatures discussed 
throughout this article to create a provisional ideal-type neoliberal habitus characterization. 
Before doing so, three reiterations must be made.   
 First, the conception of habitus offered here is defined as an agent’s acquired sum of 
related, content-specific, and contextually activated schemas that form a particular major 
component of the self, such as a role, identity, or sociocultural framework. These schemas can 
prompt nonconscious cognitive, affective, and behavioural reactions, but also fuel and can be 
modified and acted on via agential deliberation. Moreover, a subject can develop multiple 
habituses that can differ in magnitude, weight, consolidation, and automaticity, as well as 
overlap, be separate from, or conflict with one another. Hence, this habitus conception 
accounts for the capacity of subjects to develop multiple roles, identities, and cultural and 
political scripts, and to hold and act on these even when they contain inconsistent elements.  
 Second, schema encoding and development are the products of dynamic experiential, 
social interactional, and accretionary cognitive processes. To wit, schemas are first encoded 
from exposure to and interaction with novel environmental stimuli e.g., words, images, social 
practices etc., as these instances can spontaneously generate within a subject an initial 
affective, lexical, and semantic mental impression i.e., a contextually and conceptually 
specific referent (Gronau and Shachar, 2015; Kitayama and Park, 2010). This base syntax can 
be enhanced through subsequent exposure to contextual cues and information revealed during 
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interaction (Brubaker et al., 2004). Furthermore, increasing a schema’s activation potentiates 
its power to guide perception and recall, generate expectations and inferences, filter out 
competing or dissonant information, cue related schemas, and orient actions (Brod et al., 
2015; Brubaker et al., 2004; Lodge and Taber, 2005). When a given schema exceeds an 
activation threshold, it can then become automatically expressed, reinforced, and/or co-
activated with related schemas during exposure to relevant stimuli (Kitayama and Park, 2010; 
Shimizu et al., 2017). Thus an encoded schema’s dispositional strength, salience, weight, and 
network size are primarily determined by activation frequency- which is, in turn, dependent 
on: 
Proximate, situationally specific cues and triggers, not directly on large-scale 
structural or cultural contexts, though structural and cultural changes can affect 
the distribution of such proximate cues and thereby the probabilities of 
activation of schemas (Brubaker et al., 2004: 42). 
 Third and correspondingly, high levels of cultural-political discursive, material, and 
functional convergence and synchronicity between major social institutions increase the 
distribution, commonality, observability, and enforcement of dominant forms of social 
information. Individuals growing up and interacting in these auto-correlated environments are 
more likely to have the representations and affective meanings of said information encoded in 
their formative sociocultural schemas (Henrich, and Boyd, 2002). In these conditions, subjects 
are also more likely to have these schemas be chronically activated, which can over time, lead 
them to as Schroder and Thagard, (2013:256) argue: “implicitly reproduce the social order of 
their culture” (Kitayama and Park, 2010; Shimizu et al., 2017). Brubaker et al., (2004) note 
that in this respect, sociocultural schemas complement and can be used to re-specify the 
original habitus concept, as they effectively refer to 1) widely shared mental representations 
of distinct sociocultural dispositions and practices which orient corresponding outputs; and 2) 
some of the key cognitive-affective mechanisms through which subjects acquire and 
reproduce a culture and political-economic ideology (Henrich, and Boyd, 2002; Kitayama and 
Park, 2010; Schroder and Thagard, 2013).  
An individual’s sociocultural habitus can, therefore, be thought of as a network of 
associated and contiguous sociocultural schemas that correspond to the specific discourses 
and practices of whatever dominant institutions and culture they are subjected to during their 
ontogenetic development. Moreover, when instantiated, i.e., activated by relevant stimuli, this 
habitus orients contextually corresponding practices that maintain and reproduce existing 
societal arrangements. Additionally, individuals raised in institutional and cultural settings 
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that regularly promote a hegemonic ideology, and where exposure to counter-hegemonic 
discursive formations is limited, should on average develop and display more ideologically 
consistent-harmonious sociocultural habituses. Consistent with this reasoning, the content and 
development of a neoliberal habitus are thus largely a function of recurring engagement with 
institutionally and culturally omnipresent and enforced neoliberal discursive formations (i.e. 
neoliberal ideologically inflected or congruent forms of social information). We will now 
elaborate on how this particular sociocultural habitus can theoretically manifest in UK and US 
millennials, but we must first emphasize that this probabilistic formulation does not preclude 
or negate the possibility that millennials can and may be developing alternative or 
inharmonious habituses.  
Developmental research has consistently found that youth are highly susceptible to peer 
and media influences, receptive to popularly held beliefs and attitudes, and more likely to 
implicitly and explicitly conform to and enforce commonly observed norms (Easterbrook et 
al., 2014; Godfrey et al., 2017). Correspondingly, contemporary UK and US youth are 
frequently presented with social information that reflects or is congruent with neoliberal 
ideology. This includes beliefs and values such as capitalism rewards hard work, education 
leads to high paying jobs, wealth and material possessions increase happiness, welfare is too 
generous, unions are bad, etc. These are of course simplistic metonyms for complicated social 
information that is presented, framed, and enacted in myriad fashions through various 
mediums and complex forms of social interaction. But they more or less capture the gist of 
what, as i briefly outlined in the previous section, UK and US millennials are frequently 
presented by media, schools, and society at large (Coakley; 2011; Goldstein et al., 2011; 
Jensen, 2014; Patton, 2013; Uhls and Greenfield, 2011a). Furthermore, media and schools are 
the institutions where most youth possibly spend the majority of their waking hours 
interacting with others and learning about culture and politics. This indicates that said youths’ 
formative sociocultural schemas are regularly instantiated. During instantiation, incoming 
information is normally assimilated or accommodated into relevant pre-existing schemas. 
Instantiation thus facilitates encoding, and every instantiation can gradually augment a 
schema’s structure. Several factors play a role in this, but information/stimuli that are 
thematically, conceptually, or otherwise related or repeatedly presented together (e.g. media 
discourses of capitalism, wealth, material possessions), are easier to process and more likely 
to become encoded (Gilboa and Marlatte, 2017). 
Moreover, there is a high degree of conceptual, affective, and behavioural congruity 
between materialism, individualism, anti-unionism, and anti-welfare discursive formations, 
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for example, they all promote self-interested thoughts, attitudes, and practices. These 
discursive formations are also regularly proximately presented in mass media. For example, 
UK popular tabloids like the Sun and Daily Mail often feature stories about welfare ‘cheats’ 
or ‘greedy’ unions surrounded by adverts for consumer products. It stands to reason then that 
chronic engagement with these neoliberal congruent discursive formations will to some 
degree make an impression on young people’s neurocognitive architectures. If sufficiently 
strong, this impression can in relevant social contexts, organize and orient their behaviours. 
However, while it can be assumed that this impression will vary by individual, neuro-
schematic content cannot be directly observed. Therefore, to test these assertions, semantic 
and lexical conceptualizations of sociocultural schemas and practices that reflect typical 
neoliberal discursive formations must instead be developed to serve as plausible observable 
indicators. Based on everything discussed thus far, such proxy sociocultural schemas and 
practices that can reasonably be said to correspond to a neoliberal habitus, may in part entail 
those listed in Table 1. These are admittedly crude and arbitrarily worded conceptualizations, 
and some of the listed schemas and practices may need to be discarded or modified and others 
added, following empirical scrutiny. Nonetheless, while this typological composite sacrifices 
the subtleties and complexities of social reality and of plausible neuroschematic 
representations, it can a` la Weberian tradition, be used to explore and compare how, why, 
and the degree to and context in which real cases diverge from or converge with it. 
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Neoliberal Habitus 
Sociocultural Schemas Corresponding Social Practices 
 Financial wealth is a mark of success.  
 Owning more and expensive material 
possessions increases happiness.  
 Individuals should be self-reliant, self-
concerned, and entrepreneurial. 
 Continuous purchasing of or efforts to purchase 
corporate products, even in instances when it is 
known that they stem from exploitative 
conditions and/or have negative environmental 
impacts. 
 Idolising wealthy celebrities and/or 
entrepreneurs. 
 Refusal to participate in consumer boycotts if the 
corresponding product or service is cheaper than 
alternatives. 
 Socioeconomic status is principally 
determined by personal effort and 
choices. 
 Schools should primarily focus on jobs 
training.  
 The best careers are those that pay the 
highest salaries. 
 People are paid fairly according to their 
effort and skills. 
 Instrumentalist selection of schools, degrees, 
and careers. 
 Consumerist engagement with education. 
 Self-branding, networking, and impression 
management. 
 Conspicuous consumption. 
 Competition and hard work ensures 
meritocratic outcomes. 
 Public institutions should be run like 
businesses. 
 Capitalism is the only viable economic 
system. 
 Welfare recipients and impoverished 
peoples are mostly lazy and unambitious. 
 Government social programs are overly 
generous and economically burdensome. 
 Increasing taxes to fund social services is 
unfair to individuals that work hard.  
 Unions increase prices, create job losses, 
and prevent the firing of incompetent 
workers. 
 Rejecting socialist/communitarian ideas and 
policies. 
 Supporting welfare reforms that limit the 
timeframe and amount of benefits that can be 
claimed.  
 Supporting (e.g., voting for) politicians that 
prioritise market/economic growth over social, 
labour, and environmental protections.  
 Supporting politicians that promise cuts to taxes 
and funding for social programmes. 
 Refusal to join a union, participate in strikes, or 
honour picket lines. 
 Minimal contributions to charities and 
environmental conservation. 
 
 It must be stressed that the model described above, consisting of both the neoliberal 
habitus conceptualisation and typological composite is like most initial theoretical 
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abstractions, a messy first approximation in need of conceptual refinement. This includes an 
account of how other subjectivity-habitus types (e.g., gender, class) fit or differ from it, which 
cannot be sufficiently discussed here. That said, the listed sociocultural schemas and practices 
are conceptually consistent with the literature on neoliberal subjectivity and hegemony 
(Coakley, 2011; Hall and Rustin, 2015; Lloyd, 2012; O’Flynn and Petersen, 2007; Weidner, 
2009). They are also largely based on the hitherto unconnected empirical evidence showing 
some of the ways that UK and US millennials’ educational, political, and social-psychological 
values, attitudes, and practices resonate with neoliberal ideology, as described in the previous 
section. Hence, in pulling these otherwise disparate bits of evidence together and adding a 
situationally corresponding behavioural component, this model can be used to explore and test 
the extent to which UK and US millennials are developing and enacting a neoliberal habitus. 
Falsification: Some Suggestions 
Although this is not the space to outline a detailed research programme, the model offers a 
reference point for observable value, attitudinal and behavioural outputs, and proposes that the 
strength and development of these outputs are, in large part, determined by frequent 
engagement with culturally and institutionally ubiquitous, promoted and enforced neoliberal 
congruent discursive formations. Thus, the neoliberal habitus composite for instance, can be 
utilised to form qualitative interview schedules and guide ethnographic observations in 
schools, youth centres, and social media sites. In brief, this qualitative methodology would 
entail observing and documenting the extent and real-life instances in which youth 
consciously or implicitly articulate, reify, contest, or reject, as well as are presented and 
socially pressured to conform to, values, attitudes, and practices akin to those listed in the 
composite. 
 However, an easier and more concrete way to test the model, is to use the typological 
composite to develop psychometric survey scales, and/or a variation of the Implicit 
Association Test –which is used to measure individuals’ non-conscious attitudinal 
associations, valence, and biases (see e.g., Srivastavaa and Banaji, 2011). These can be 
coupled with other survey or experimental instruments that gauge contextual behavioural 
responses, such as vignettes that describe neoliberal welfare and economic policies, and 
measure participants’ support for their enactment. Additionally, gauging exposure and 
pressure to conform to neoliberal congruent discursive formations can for starters be done by 
measuring the frequency with which the following occur: 
1. Participants consume materialistic and politically mainstream media content. 
2. Participants are complimented by their peers for purchasing branded consumer 
  
21 
products, and ridiculed for having outdated products. 
3. Participants are encouraged by their parents, peers, teachers, or media to select careers 
primarily on salary concerns, and discouraged from aspiring to typically lesser-paid 
socially minded careers (e.g., social worker, teacher). 
4. Participants are encouraged by their parents, peers, teachers, or media to vote for 
mainstream pro-market party candidates, and discouraged to vote for or engage with 
market-critical politicians, parties, and ideas.  
This quantitative methodology can then be used to test two preliminary hypotheses: 
H1: The schemas in the model are hypothesized to be contagious, such that the activation 
of one should theoretically prime the activation of the others. These schemas are 
therefore predicted to be significantly and positively correlated with each other and with 
the featured social practices. 
H2: Increase in the frequencies of cases 1, 2, 3, or 4, will positively moderate the holding 
and enactment of the values, attitudes, and practices listed in the model. 
The statistical significance of H1 and H2 will likely be affected by relevant demographic 
factors (e.g., age, class, gender, ethnicity, education) and psychographic factors (e.g., formal 
political socialization, social dominance orientation). The mediating and moderating effects of 
these factors should thus be examined. Lastly, whichever methods are used to test this model, 
its testing can help: (1) to identify some of the necessary and sufficient conditions and factors 
that generate, potentiate, or hinder the processes of neoliberal subjectivity-habitus formation; 
and (2) to inform understandings of the societal consequences of these processes; the 
sociological research for both of which is currently limited. 
Conclusion 
When considered together, growing evidence from parallel bodies of sociological and 
psychological research suggests that the ongoing neoliberal subjectification of UK and US 
millennials is associated with various adverse social and psychological effects (Easterbrook et 
al., 2014; Lloyd, 2012; Uhls and Greenfield, 2011a). This process may also be generating 
indifference towards or directly feeding the growing levels of socioeconomic disparity and 
environmental degradation induced by the past 30 years of neoliberalism. It is this article’s 
contention that to better understand and investigate all these interrelated phenomena, current 
sociological accounts can benefit from a more in-depth conceptualization and formalization of 
the specific subjectivity habitus that can develop from extended interaction with 
institutionally and culturally prevalent neoliberal discursive formations. To this end, a 
cognitive-sociological model is proposed to explain and examine the ways in which 
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sociocultural cognitive-affective mechanisms enable, constrain, and mediate individual 
thought and action, and the ways these then help to sustain the current neoliberal order. While 
this model in no way captures the complexity of these dynamics, it incorporates rich 
theoretical insights from the cognitive sciences, and offers a novel framework for how to 
more robustly conceptualize and empirically explore them. Finally, although this model is 
situated within a US and UK context, it offers a set of falsifiable propositions and 
methodological recommendations that can be applied and tested in countries with advanced or 
burgeoning neoliberalization. 
Notes: 
1. Subjectification is defined here as the process of becoming a subject i.e., of forming a self-
identity or multiple identities. Social reproduction refers to “all the mechanisms, processes, 
and practices by which multiple social hierarchies, divisions and relations of wealth, power, 
and influence are sustained and re-created over time” (Gewirtz and Cribb, 2009: 86). 
2. Some of the examples that I provide to empirically support this claim have been plucked 
from nationally representative datasets and extensive developmental psychology research, but 
are conceptually consistent with the literature on neoliberal hegemony and subjectification. 
Thus, the account and examples that I provide in this article are not based on the research or 
meant to bolster popular accounts that depict millennials as being self-entitled and unwilling 
to commit to employment (Allen et al., 2015). Such dispositions may indeed be in some way a 
product of neoliberal policy and structural changes, but there is currently little, and even then 
conflicting, empirical evidence to support the notion that millennials exhibit these dispositions 
more so than previous birth cohorts (Fogarty et al., 2017). Moreover, because of this very 
limited empirical grounding, the analyses and model described in this article does not account 
for this infant research. 
3. Self-interestedness, competitiveness, materialism, and rationalism are also core to liberal 
precursors and thus not unique to neoliberalism. The argument here is simply that these traits 
are considerably more amplified and promoted in neoliberal societies. 
4. The original habitus construct is defined by Bourdieu (1977: 5) as a: “system of lasting, 
transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions at every moment as a 
matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions and makes possible the achievement of 
infinitely diversified tasks, thanks to analogical transfers of schemes permitting the solution of 
similarly shaped problems”. 
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